ELIMINATING THE PHRASE R EPRESENTS AND
WARRANTS FROM CONTRACTS
KENNETH A. ADAMS†

The phrase represents and warrants is a fixture in English-language contracts.
It’s used to introduce statements of fact, as are the verbs represents and warrants
used separately. And the words representation and warranty are used to refer to
statements of fact in a contract.
In the United States, courts and most practitioners attribute no particular
significance to use of represents and warrants to introduce statements of fact,
although some U.S. commenters suggest that the phrase has implications for
remedies. By contrast, in England, courts, practitioners, and commentators accept
that those verbs do have implications for remedies, with represents leaving open the
possibility of tort remedies for misrepresentation and warrants leaving open the
possibility of contract remedies for breach of warranty.
Given that the U.S. and English legal systems share so much, and given
that contracts drafted in the United States and England share essentially the same
language, the different treatment accorded the verbs represents and warrants under
the two systems suggests that something is amiss.
Something is indeed amiss, in that it’s pointless and confusing to use
represents or warrants in a contract to introduce statements of fact. Those who
attribute significance to those verbs, whether used separately or together, ignore
the powers and responsibilities of those who draft or review contract language.
This article will show that to avoid this confusion, you should do two
things. First, use states to introduce statements of fact in a contract. And second, if
you want to exclude particular remedies or make sure that they’re available, do so
explicitly instead of relying on inscrutable code.
This article first considers how drafters use represents and warrants in the
United States, explanations offered for their significance, and how those
explanations fall short. It then does the same for use of represents and warrants in
England. It then offers an alternative explanation for prevalence of the phrase
represents and warrants and recommends alternative ways to address issues
Kenneth A. Adams is a speaker and consultant on contract drafting and author of A Manual of
Style for Contract Drafting (3d ed. 2013). He is also adjunct professor at Notre Dame Law School.
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ostensibly underlying use of represents and warrants. It then considers use of warrants
in the context of sale of goods. It closes by considering some broader
implications.
I. UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Usage
In English-language contracts generally, represents or warrants or both are
used to introduce statements of fact by parties—statements relating to matters
that they broadly control or that fall within the scope of their operations.
In the United States, sometimes only one verb is used, but usually both
are joined in a doublet—represents and warrants. For example, this author
determined that of the 106 contracts in the sample used in the 2009 Private
Target Deal Points Study, 1 all used either represents and warrants or representations and
warranties (with a different verb) to introduce statements of fact, except for one,
which used just represents. 2 (One also sees, but much less frequently, warrants and
represents, with the order reversed.)
Sometimes one or more verbs are added to represents and warrants (whether
used separately or together), as in Acme represents and acknowledges and Acme
represents, warrants, covenants, and agrees. This sort of erratic use of verbs is in keeping
with the chaotic use of verb structures in traditional contract language generally. 3
In the first of the two preceding examples, adding acknowledges to represents
inappropriately conflates the two kinds of “language of declaration,” this author’s
term for the ways one can state facts in a contract. 4 Use of acknowledges suggests
that a party isn’t stating a fact regarding matters that it broadly controls or that fall
within the scope of its operations but instead is accepting as accurate a statement
of fact that the other side of the transaction claims is accurate or one the accuracy
of which both sides are equally capable of ascertaining. 5
As for the second of the two preceding examples, adding covenants and
agrees supplements language of declaration with two other categories of contract

American Bar Association Mergers & Acquisitions Market Trends Subcommittee, 2009 Private
Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study (Dec. 23, 2009) (available only to members of
the Committee on Mergers and Acquisitions at http://link.reuters.com/muc78q).
1

2

See KENNETH A. ADAMS, THE STRUCTURE OF M&A CONTRACTS § 2.32 (2011).

3

See KENNETH A. ADAMS, A MANUAL OF STYLE FOR CONTRACT DRAFTING ch. 3 (3d ed. 2013).

4

See id. ¶ 3.270.

5

See id. ¶ 3.313.
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language, namely language of obligation and language of agreement. 6 That
suggests that the drafter intends to convey three kinds of meaning in one
statement. In terms of semantics, that doesn’t make sense.
So this article addresses use of only one or both of represents and warrants
to introduce statements of fact.
Furthermore, a different analysis applies to the verb warrants and the noun
warranty on their own, without represents and representation, regarding goods in a
contract for the sale of those goods. That’s addressed later in this article. 7
B. Remedies for Inaccurate Statements of Fact
Determining what represents and warrants each mean requires considering
the remedies available under U.S. law for inaccurate statements of fact in a
contract.
Due to how the common law has developed in U.S. states, if a party’s
statement of fact turns out to have been inaccurate, the counterparty might be
able to bring a tort-based claim for misrepresentation, a contract-based claim for
breach of warranty, or both.
Detailed analysis of the distinction between a claim for misrepresentation
and a claim for breach of warranty is beyond the scope of this article. Instead,
here’s a summary of the distinction offered in one work regarding statements of
fact:
A misrepresentation claim is grounded in tort and seeks to redress
breaches of a party's common law duty to establish honestly the
“factual predicates” to his or her commercial relationships. But
misrepresentation liability is generally not imposed strictly on the
basis that a given representation was incorrect. Instead, liability
only attaches if the defendant made a material misrepresentation
fraudulently or, in some cases, negligently, upon which the
recipient justifiably relied to his or her detriment.
A claim based upon a breach of an express warranty, by contrast,
is premised upon one party's specific contractual promise that a
stipulated fact or set of facts is correct. If the warranty set forth in
the written agreement is incorrect, it would be irrelevant that the
See Kenneth A. Adams, “Represents, Warrants, Covenants, and Agrees,” ADAMS ON CONTRACT
DRAFTING (June 18, 2009), http://www.adamsdrafting.com/represents-warrants-covenants-andagrees/.
6

7

See infra pp. 224-26.
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warranting party honestly believed that the disputed statement was
true, that the recipient of the warranty did not rely upon the
incorrect statement, or that the warranty was not a material basis
upon which the complaining party entered into the contract.
Indeed, a warranty is strictly enforced like any other contractual
covenant or agreement, generally without regard for intention,
materiality, or reliance. 8
In that context, the simplest meaning of representation is that it’s a
statement of fact that might support a claim for misrepresentation. And the
simplest meaning of warranty is that it’s a statement of fact that might support a
claim for breach of warranty.
C. The Remedies Rationale
Some U.S. commentators have attempted to attribute significance to each
verb in represents and warrants. They fall into two camps, one offering what this
article calls the “remedies rationale,” the other offering what this article calls the
“timeframe rationale.”
The most explicit statement of the remedies rationale is offered in Tina L.
Stark’s book Drafting Contracts: How Lawyers Do What They Do: “By virtue of [the
line ‘The Seller represents and warrants to the Buyer as follows’], every statement
in the sections that followed would be both a representation and a warranty.” 9
Stark goes into greater detail later in that book. Regarding the sentence
Party A represents and warrants to Party B as follows, Stark says the following:
The language introducing representations and warranties is simple
and results in each statement of fact being both a representation
and a warranty.
…
Using represents and warrants together, rather than either term alone,
precludes any ambiguity as to the contract’s meaning. It plainly
states the parties’ intent: that a party both represents and warrants
the statements that follow.
Glenn D. West & W. Benton Lewis, Jr., Contracting to Avoid Extra-Contractual Liability—Can Your
Contractual Deal Ever Really Be the “Entire” Deal?, 64 BUS. LAW. 999, 1008 (2009) (footnotes
omitted); see generally RICHARD A. LORD, 18 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 52:45, §69:5 (4th ed.)
[hereinafter WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS] (general discussion of warranties and misrepresentation).
8

TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: HOW AND WHY LAWYERS DO WHAT THEY DO 15 (2d
ed. 2014).

9
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The phrase represents and warrants differs from other couplets
and triplets where the words are synonymous. With respect to
those phrases, a drafter can safely omit all but one of the words
without changing the phrase’s meaning. But using just represents or
warrants could create different legal consequences because those
terms have different substantive meanings. Using only one of
them raises the possibility that the parties intended the
consequences of only that term. It invites litigation. … By using
both represents and warrants, a drafter reduces a client’s litigation
risk by explicitly saying what the parties mean—a cardinal
principle of good drafting. 10
Whether a contract party is able to bring a claim for misrepresentation or
a claim for breach of warranty for an inaccurate statement of fact by the other
party can have significant practical implications. According to the remedies
rationale, a drafter can ensure that a statement of fact is treated as a
representation, as a warranty, or as both by introducing that statement of fact
with represents, warrants, or both, respectively, or by identifying that statement as a
representation, a warranty, or both.
The remedies rationale comes in two flavors, which this article calls
“permissive” and “restrictive.” Under both the permissive remedies rationale and
the restrictive remedies rationale, explicitly describing a statement of fact as a
representation, a warranty, or both, by means of an introductory verb or
otherwise, is sufficient to make it so.
Where the permissive and restrictive rationales differ is how they treat a
statement of fact that isn’t introduced by represents or warrants, or both, or
otherwise explicitly characterized as a representation, a warranty, or both. Under
the permissive version, such a naked statement of fact could still be deemed a
representation or warranty, respectively, depending on the nature of the statement
itself. By contrast, the restrictive version holds that a statement of fact will
support a claim for misrepresentation only if it is introduced with represents or is
referred to as a representation, and a statement of fact will support a claim for
breach of warranty only if it is introduced with warrants or is referred to as a
warranty. So under the restrictive version, failure to use represents, warrants, or both,
or to otherwise explicitly characterize a statement of fact as a representation, a
warranty, or both, should prevent that statement from being deemed a
representation or a warranty, or both, respectively.
10

Id. at 137–38 (citations omitted).
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Stark has stated that she doesn’t suggest that using represents or warrants is
the only way to make something a representation or warranty. 11 That means she
in effect endorses the permissive remedies rationale.
By contrast, the restrictive remedies rationale is on display in the entry for
representations and warranties in Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage. After suggesting
what distinguishes representations from warranties, it says the following:
Some have asked this: if the warranty gives so much more
protection than a representation, why not simply use warranty
alone—without representation? It’s a fair point, perhaps, but
here’s the reason for sticking to both: some parties to a contract
don’t want merely a guarantee that so-and-so will be so in the
future; they also want an eye-to-eye statement (representation)
that the thing is so now. If it later turns out not to have been so
when the representation was made, the party claiming breach can
complain of a lie. … If only a warranty were in place, the
breaching party could simply say, “I’ll make good on your
losses—as I always said I would—but I never told you that suchand such was the case.” Hence representations and warranties. 12
In other words, Bryan Garner suggests that if a statement of fact is
introduced by only warrants and not represents, it wouldn’t constitute a
representation supporting an action for misrepresentation: the drafter would be in
a position to limit what sort of claims could be brought for an inaccurate
statement of fact regardless of the nature of that statement of fact. So Garner in
effect endorses the restrictive remedies rationale.
To find others of like mind, look to commentary on the English caselaw
to the effect that the one or more verbs you use to introduce statements of fact
can limit the remedies available. 13 Two commentators in the United States have
said that the English approach might apply equally in the United States. 14 That

Tina L. Stark, Comment to Kenneth A. Adams, The Semantics Fallacy Underlying “Represents and
Warrants,” ADAMS ON CONTRACT DRAFTING (Sept. 24, 2013, 2:38 PM),
http://www.adamsdrafting.com/the-semantics-fallacy-underlying-represents-and-warrants/
(“Nowhere in my textbook or in any of my other writings do I state or suggest that the only way
to create representations and warranties is to precede statements of fact with the words ‘represents
and warrants.’”).

11

12

BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 775 (3d ed. 2011).

13

See infra text accompanying note 43, 51.
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suggests those commentators see some validity in the restrictive remedies
rationale.
Both flavors of the remedies rationale fall short in several respects.
1. It Seeks to Apply to All Kinds of Contracts
First, represents and warrants is used in every kind of contract. It’s well
known that the law of warranties applies to the sale of goods, 15 but even if you
also take into account the role of the law of warranties in negotiable instruments,
bank deposits and collections, letters of credit, documents of title, and investment
securities, all sorts of contracts that use represents and warrants would fall outside
the scope of the law of warranties as it’s generally understood. 16 It follows that
treating as a warranty any contract statement of fact introduced by warrants or
referred to as a warranty would require extending the law of warranties to
statements of fact to which the law of warranties as it is generally understood
wouldn’t apply. There’s no principled basis for doing so.
2. It Seeks to Override Actual Meaning
Second, caselaw and, with respect to warranty, the Uniform Commercial
Code specify the elements of a claim for misrepresentation and a claim for breach
of warranty. Allowing drafters to designate what constitutes a representation or a
warranty just by saying so would render those requirements irrelevant.
Imagine that a contract contains the following sentence: Acme represents
that it shall promptly replace defective Equipment. Even though it uses represents, that
sentence imposes an obligation, so according to caselaw on the elements of a
claim for misrepresentation, it wouldn’t constitute a representation supporting a
See Glenn D. West, That Pesky Little Thing Called Fraud: An Examination of Buyers’ Insistence Upon
(and Sellers’ Too Ready Acceptance of) Undefined “Fraud Carve-Outs” in Acquisition Agreements, 69 BUS.
LAW. 1049, 1058 n.47 (2014) (noting that a recent English case, Sycamore Bidco Ltd. v. Breslin,
[2012] EWHC (Ch) 3443 (Eng.), suggested that the debate over whether there is a difference
between representations and warranties in the United States could be reopened); Claude Serfilippi,
A New York Lawyer in London: Representations and Warranties in Acquisition Agreements—What’s the Big
Deal?, CORP. PRAC. NEWSWIRE (Chadbourne & Parke LLP, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 2012, at 1, 2,
available at http://goo.gl/dOHzsK (“What most U.S. lawyers might not appreciate, however, is
that the distinction in remedies that forms the basis for the solicitor’s objection to include both
representations and warranties in an acquisition agreement, is also present under the laws of most
U.S. states. Yet, U.S. lawyers routinely include both representations and warranties in an
acquisition agreement.”).
14

15

See infra note 72 and accompanying text.

16

See U.C.C. §§ 3-416, 3-417, 4-207, 5-110, 7-507, 7-508, 8-108, 8-109.
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claim for misrepresentation. It would elevate form over substance to suggest that
use of represents would be enough to make that sentence a representation.
The preceding example is intentionally an extreme one, but the problem
isn’t one of degree. Instead, it’s inherent in the remedies rationale.
It would be equally bizarre to conclude, as the restrictive remedies
rationale requires, that an intended remedy isn’t available because it’s not
introduced by the appropriate verb. For example, if a party’s statements of fact
are introduced by neither represents nor warrants, according to the logic of the
restrictive remedies rationale the counterparty would have no remedy, regardless
of the nature of those statements. It would be hard to justify that.
3. It’s Not Supported by the Law
Third, U.S. caselaw supporting the remedies rationale is elusive.
This author has found no U.S. caselaw supporting the notion that if you
use represents in a sentence, what follows will as a matter of law constitute a
representation supporting an action for misrepresentation, regardless of what the
sentence says, or that if you use warrants in a sentence, what follows will as a
matter of law constitute a warranty supporting an action for breach of warranty,
regardless of what the sentence says.
Stark has pointed to five cases that support “the contention that the use
of ‘warrants’ creates warranties.” 17 As this author reads those cases, four do not in
fact address the point at issue, 18 and the fifth, mentioned below, 19 appears to
support the restrictive version of the remedies rationale—that if represents or
warrants is absent, so is the related remedy.
And in seeking to rebut earlier expressions of this author’s views on
represents and warrants, Stark has twice pointed to the “seminal” case of CBS Inc. v.
Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 20 in which the court held that knowing that a warranty

17

Stark, supra note 11.

Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 360 (2d Cir. 1992); Ainger v. Michigan Gen. Corp.,
476 F.Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) aff’d, 632 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1980); Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51
N.Y. 198, 202 (1872); Century 21, Inc. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 181 A.D.2d 620, 624, 582
N.Y.S.2d 101, 104 (App. Div. 1992) (although the court noted that “[t]he word ‘warranty’ does
not appear in any of the parties’ agreements,” that has no bearing on what the implications would
have been had the word warranty been used).
18

19

See infra note 28 and accompanying text.

20

553 N.E.2d 997 (1990).
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had been breached did not preclude the buyer from seeking indemnification. 21
But the Ziff-Davis court didn’t attribute any significance to the one or more verbs
used to introduce the relevant statement of fact, so Ziff-Davis cannot be cited in
support of the remedies rationale.
Stark suggests that two law-review articles support the notion that use of
the verb warrants creates warranties. 22 One, a 1980 article by Richard A. Lord,
states that “[t]he clearest case of warranty being created is found in oral or written
warranties denominated as such.” 23 But Lord says only that use of the words
guaranty, warranty, promise, and affirm “will aid a court in imposing warranty
liability.” 24 That falls well short of the certainty promised by the remedies
rationale. Furthermore, Lord acknowledges that what follows such a word can
muddy the waters. 25
The second article, published in 1923, states that “use of the word
‘warrant’ by the seller has been held sufficient proof of an intent to warrant.” 26
But saying that a contract party intended to create a warranty is different from
saying that the party in fact created a warranty. Furthermore, the only support for
that statement is a 1911 opinion of the Supreme Court of Iowa in which the court
noted that “[t]he petition declared upon a ‘warranty’ in express terms.” 27 That
doesn’t allow one to conclude that the court attributed more importance to the
word “warranty” than the rest of the statement in question. And more broadly,
that one century-old case is a slim basis for a general pronouncement.
As for the restrictive version of the remedies rationale, there’s scant
support for the notion that to constitute a representation, a statement must be
introduced by represents or referred to as a representation, and to constitute a
warranty, a statement must be introduced by warrants or referred to as a warranty.
In one of the cases Stark cites, Pentair, Inc. v. Wisconsin Energy, the U.S.
District Court for Minnesota stated as follows:
See Tina L. Stark, Another View on Reps and Warranties, 15 BUS. L. TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 8,
8–9; Stark, supra note 11.

21

22

Stark, supra note 11.

Richard A. Lord, Some Thoughts About Warranty Law: Express and Implied Warranties, 56 N.D. L.
REV. 509, 514 n.14 (1980).
23

24

Id. at 514.

25

See id. at 514 n.14.

26

George Gleason Bogert, Express Warranties in Sales of Goods, 33 Yale L.J. 14, 28 (1923).

27

Davis v. Berkheimer, 132 N.W. 377, 377 (1911).

212

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16

If the seller merely makes a factual representation (e.g., “this car
has four new tires”)—but the seller does not go further and
expressly agree that his representation is a warranty (e.g., “I hereby
warrant that this car has four new tires”)—the buyer cannot
recover for breach of warranty unless she can prove that she relied
on the factual representation. 28
But according to this case, reliance is enough to make up for absence of
warrants—a possibility not reflected in the restrictive remedies rationale.
Furthermore, this one anomalous opinion is more than offset by cases in which
use of represents or representations in a contract doesn’t preclude the court from
concluding that the statement in question is actually a warranty. 29 And section 2313(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code states that “[i]t is not necessary to the
creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as ‘warrant’
or ‘guarantee’ or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty.” 30
4. Semantically, It Makes No Sense
Fourth, the semantics of the remedies rationale makes no sense.
Consider the following statement of fact: The Inventory is in good condition.
To be of use in a contract, it’s missing something—any indication who is making
the statement. What’s required to remedy that is a subject and a verb. The subject
would be one or more of the contract parties. In everyday English you would
have any number verbs to choose from: says, grunts, proclaims, screams, asserts. But in
a contract, the only purpose the verb serves, from a standard-English perspective,
is to link the subject to the statement of fact.
To permit the verb to have remedies implications, or to require it do so, is
to impose on the verb a semantic function it doesn’t have in standard English. It’s
unreasonable to expect readers to make that connection.
5. It Doesn’t Explain Current Practice
And fifth, what is the simplest explanation for prevalence of use of
represents and warrants outside of the context of statements of fact relating to
goods? It isn’t that after considering potential remedies if a dispute occurs,
28

Pentair, Inc. v. Wisconsin Energy Corp., 662 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (D. Minn. 2009).

See, e.g., Aspect Systems, Inc. v. Lam Research Corp., No. CV 06-1620-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL
2705154, at *9 (D. Ariz. June 26, 2008) (describing as a “warranty” a contract provision
introduced by the verb “represents”); Quality Wash Group V, Ltd. v. Hallak, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 592,
596 (Ct. App. 1996), at 596 (describing as a “warranty” a provision introduced by “makes the
following representations”).
29

30

U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
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contract parties opt to make it explicit that inaccurate statements of fact could
give rise to an action for misrepresentation or an action for breach of warranty, or
both.
Instead, if contract parties are presented with three options with
ostensibly meaningful implications—represents, warrants, or represents and warrants—
yet overwhelmingly opt for represents and warrants regardless of the nature of the
transaction, the simplest explanation is that they don’t recognize that they’re
making a choice.
That impression is reinforced by the way mergers-and-acquisitions
contracts generally provide for indemnification as the exclusive remedy 31 yet
overwhelmingly use represents and warrants. 32 If use of represents and warrants is an
empty gesture there, economy of hypothesis suggests that it’s an empty gesture
elsewhere. It also follows that there’s no reason to attribute significance to use of
either represents or warrants alone.
In addition, in its discussion of represents and warrants the ABA Model Stock
Purchase Agreement does not mention the remedies rationale. 33 Either those
members of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association
responsible for the ABA Model Stock Purchase Agreement are unfamiliar with the
remedies rationale or they felt that it wasn’t worth mentioning.
So it’s reasonable to conclude that in the United States, the remedies
rationale for use of represents and warrants is of no practical relevance.
D. The Timeframe Rationale
The clearest articulation of the timeframe rationale for using represents,
warrants, or both is that offered by the Section of Business Law of the American
Bar Association in the second edition of the ABA Model Stock Purchase Agreement,
which uses the phrase represents and warrants: “Representations are statements of
past or existing facts and warranties are promises that existing or future facts are
or will be true.” 34 If you take that at face value, it follows that “[a] party can, for
See LOU R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES,
SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 15.02[4] (2011).
31

32

See supra text accompanying note 2.

33

See infra text accompanying note 34.

I COMMITTEE ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, SECTION OF BUSINESS LAW, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY 77 (2011)
[hereinafter ABA MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT]; id. at 82, 192 (instances of use of
represents and warrants).
34
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instance, represent and warrant that as of a prior date his net worth was $75,000;
he can also warrant that as of a future date his net worth will be that amount.” 35
If one looks hard enough, one can find caselaw and other commentary
that endorses the timeframe rationale. 36 But the timeframe rationale suffers from
flaws that render it untenable as an explanation of how one should use represents
and warrants in contracts.
1. It Seeks to Apply to All Kinds of Contracts
First, as with the remedies rationale, 37 the timeframe rationale is
inconsistent with the law of warranties, because it suggests that a statement of
fact can be a warranty not just in contracts for the sale of goods and other
contracts to which the law of warranties has been held to apply but in any kind of
contract.
2. It’s Not Supported by the Law
Second, one requirement of an action for misrepresentation is indeed that a party
have made a false representation as to fact with regard to a past event or present
circumstance, but not a future event38—when a statement as to future
circumstances is made there is no way to determine when it is made whether it’s
accurate or not. But nothing in the law of warranties suggests that to be a
warranty a statement of fact must pertain only to existing or future facts. Instead,
the Uniform Commercial Code says that “[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise
made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of
the basis of the bargain” is sufficient to create an express warranty. 39 One could
conclude that the timeframe rationale was devised by commentators overeager for
a way to distinguish between represents and warrants.

35

I BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS 170 (John W. Herz & Charles H. Baller, 2d ed. 1981).

See, e.g., Krys v. Henderson, 69 S.E.2d 635, 637 (1952) (“Generally, warranties relate to future
events, and representations to past or existing facts … .”); Mark A. Primack, Representations,
Warranties and Covenants: Back to the Basics in Contracts, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 1, 2009) (“The key
difference among these words is temporal—past and present for representations; past, present,
but mainly future for warranties … .”).
36

37

See supra text accompanying notes 15–16.

See 26 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 8, § 69:5 (“[A] false representation made by a
defendant, to be actionable, must relate to an existing fact or a past event.”).

38

39

U.C.C. § 2-313.
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3. Semantically, It Makes No Sense
And third, even if the law of warranties were to apply to every contract,
and even if warranties were to pertain only to existing or future facts, the
timeframe rationale would still fail because as a matter of semantics, it doesn’t
make sense.
For the timeframe rationale to apply to contract language, a drafter would
have to choose the verb that introduces a statement of fact based on the nature of
that fact. As the ABA Model Stock Purchase Agreement suggests, that would be “a
drafting nuisance” 40—drafters would have to use represents or warrants to introduce
a given statement of fact, depending on whether that fact is a past or existing fact
or a future or existing fact, respectively. But more to the point, that exercise
would be a charade. It would be evident from a statement of fact itself whether
it’s a past fact, existing fact, or future fact, so taking the time to make sure that the
verb used to introduce that statement of fact matches its content would add no
value. And the timeframe rationale suggests the bizarre result that if a statement
of past fact were introduced by warrants instead of represents, it wouldn’t constitute
a past fact and so couldn’t be used to support an action for misrepresentation.
So as an explanation for why contracts use the phrase represents and
warrants, the timeframe rationale is as lacking as the remedies rationale.
II. ENGLISH LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Usage
Whereas in the United States courts and practitioners mostly treat both
represents and warrants as meaning the same thing when used to introduce a
statement of fact, in England a different view prevails. There, it appears to be
standard practice to use only warrants. The concern is that a claim for
misrepresentation could give rise to the remedy of rescission, with the parties
being returned to the situation they were in before they entered into the
contract. 41 The idea is that by using only warrants, the party making the statements
of fact avoids making representations and so avoids being subject to a claim for
misrepresentation. 42

40

See ABA MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT, supra note 34, at 77.

See 1 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS ¶¶ 6-103 to -133 (H. G. Beale ed., 30th ed. 2008) (discussing
rescission for termination).

41

See Claude Serfilippi, A New York Lawyer in London: Representations and Warranties in Acquisition
Agreements—What’s the Big Deal?, CORP. PRAC. NEWSWIRE (Chadbourne & Parke LLP, New York,
N.Y.), Dec. 2012, at 1, available at http://goo.gl/dOHzsK (“In contrast, in an acquisition
42
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B. Caselaw
This view was recently endorsed by the English High Court in Sycamore
Bidco Ltd. v. Breslin. 43 Sycamore purchased the shares of a company from Breslin
and another. After the transaction was consummated, Sycamore found errors in
the company’s audited accounts. The sellers had made statements regarding the
accounts in the share purchase agreement, so Sycamore sued for breach of
warranty and misrepresentation. The relevant language was introduced using the
verb warrant, and the statements were referred to as warranties. 44 Sycamore argued
that “the warranties are also capable of being representations so that, if there is a
contravention of their terms, there is also a misrepresentation,” 45 but Justice
Mann held that “I find that they are warranties only, and not representations,”
primarily because “[t]he warranties in this case are clearly, and at all times,
described as such, and are nowhere described as representations.” 46 This is the
restrictive remedies rationale, offered without explanation.
Sycamore Bidco is no anomaly. Another case to similar effect is MAN
Nutzfahrzeuge AG v. Freightliner Ltd., where the court said, “By drafting the clauses
in question as both representations and warranties the parties have attached
different characteristics to the statements they contain which, depending on the
circumstances, may give rise to different consequences and different measures of
loss.” 47

agreement governed by English law, counsel for sellers and buyers would generally agree that it is
standard market practice to provide solely warranties and to not make any representation with
respect to the business to be sold. English counsel for a seller is vigilant in ensuring that none of
the factual statements regarding the business to be sold are in any way described as a
representation.”); Leona N. Ferera, John R. Phillips, Julian Runnicles & Jeffery D. Schwartz, Some
Differences in Law and Practice Between U.K. and U.S. Stock Purchase Agreements, MONDAQ, Apr. 16,
2007, available at http://goo.gl/AnfWc3 [hereinafter Jones Day Newsletter] (“In the U.K., it is
common for the seller to resist giving representations as well as warranties and to delete the word
‘representation’ from the agreement. The deletion of the term ‘representation’ is considered, in
some quarters, to minimize the risk of a tortious claim for damages under the Misrepresentation
Act 1967 and to remove the possibility that the buyer will attempt to rescind the agreement ab
initio under the provisions of that Act.”).
43

[2012] EWHC (Ch) 3443 (Eng.).

44

Id. appendix (“The SPA,” clause 5).

45

Id. ¶ 200.

46

Id. ¶ 203.

47

[2005] EWHC 2347, 2005 WL 2893816, at *32 (QBD (Comm Ct) 2005).
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Indeed, the restrictive remedies rationale has a long history in England.
The 1603 case Chandelor v. Lopus48 involved a dispute between the buyer and the
seller of a bezoar stone—a concretion found in the gut of certain animals and
believed by some to have occult qualities. The seller had “affirmed” to the buyer
that the item in question was a bezoar stone. The court held that as the seller
hadn’t stated that he was “warranting” that the item was a bezoar stone, the buyer
couldn’t bring against the seller a claim for breach of warranty.
Nevertheless, English law is not settled on the matter. For example, the
opinion in Sycamore Bidco discusses the 2009 High Court opinion by Justice Arnold
in Invertec Ltd v De Mol Holding BV. 49 In that case, the defendants argued that
because the claims were “all framed by reference to warranties” in the underlying
share purchase agreement, the claimant couldn’t bring a claim for
misrepresentation. But the court held that “the warranties in question also
amount to representations of fact.” It continued (emphasis added):
In those circumstances I cannot see any reason in principle why
[the claimant] cannot claim that it was induced to enter into the
agreement by the representations made by those warranties so as to found
a misrepresentation claim if they were false, particularly if they
were fraudulently made. 50
In other words, by finding that something the contract referred to as a
warranty was also a representation supporting a misrepresentation remedy, Justice
Arnold in effect rejected the restrictive remedies rationale. Justice Mann’s
perfunctory analysis in Sycamore Bidco provides no reason to consign Invertec to
oblivion.
Sycamore Bidco was greeted with deference by English practitioners, 51 but a
2007 analysis by the London office of the international law firm Jones Day
expresses little enthusiasm for the restrictive remedies rationale:

48

79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. Ch. 1603).

49

[2009] EWHC 2471 (Ch).

50

Id.

See, e.g., Emma Dolphin, Warranties and Representations? Why It Matters (Shoosmiths), Jan. 17,
2013, available at http://goo.gl/oh5TbB; Daniella Lloyd, When Is a Representation Also a Warranty?
The £10 Million Question (Farrer & Co.), Feb. 2013, available at http://goo.gl/Ueo2Xz; Raymond L.
Sweigart & Christopher D. Gunson, “Reps” and Warranties: One Could Cost More Than the Other Under
English Contract Law (Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP), Aug. 5, 2013, available at
http://goo.gl/JNXIIU; David Vaughan & Clark Sargent, Representations and Warranties: Can One

51
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In reality, the simple categorization of a statement as a warranty (without
any further provisions) probably has little bearing on whether the
statement is susceptible to being treated as a representation for purposes
of [the Misrepresentation Act of 1967]. 52
C. Rationale
In sum, English courts and practitioners differ from those in the United States by
giving significant but not overwhelming support to the restrictive remedies
rationale. Yet the remedies rationale suffers from some of the same weakness for
purposes of English contracts as it does for U.S. contracts: First, it applies the law
of warranties where it doesn’t belong. Second, allowing drafters to designate what
constitutes a representation or a warranty just by saying so would make a mockery
of the substantive law regarding what’s required to bring a claim for
misrepresentation and what’s required to bring a claim for breach of warranty.
And third, in terms of semantics, it doesn’t make sense.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION
Why in the United States is the phrase represents and warrants generally used
to introduce statements of fact? In this author’s experience, hardly any
transactional lawyers attribute meaning to the individual components of the
phrase. Instead, they think of it as meaning simply that a party is asserting the
facts stated. So it’s not surprising that the ABA Model Stock Purchase Agreement
states that although it follows common practice in using both representations and
warranties in the model agreement, “The technical difference between the two has
proven unimportant in acquisition practice.” 53 Additionally, in his book Anatomy
of a Merger, James Freund uses representation and warranty interchangeably. 54
That indifference to refined meanings for represents and warrants in
mergers-and-acquisitions practice could be because mergers-and-acquisitions
contracts generally specify that indemnification is the exclusive remedy, 55 making
other remedies irrelevant. But lack of interest isn’t limited to the mergers-andacquisitions world. For example, a treatise on drafting commercial contracts uses
just “Seller warrants” to introduce what it refers to as “the representations and
Clause Be Both at the Same Time? (Wragge & Co LLP), Jan. 30, 2013, available at
http://us.practicallaw.com/3-523-7944.
52

Jones Day Newsletter, supra note 42.

53

See I ABA MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT, supra note 34, at 77.

54

See JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 153 n.33 (1975).

55

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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warranties of the seller.” 56 And neither it nor another treatise on drafting
commercial contracts 57 offers any explanation for the dual terminology.
Practitioners appear not to distinguish between represents and warrants, but
they do tend to use both verbs in a doublet. Perhaps an explanation for that lies
in remedies terminology. The word misrepresentation and phrase breach of warranty are
both couched in terms of a violation, inviting one to refer to that which was
violated as a representation and as a warranty, respectively. Because the two words
each have a verb form, one easily falls into saying that in making a representation,
a contract party represents, and in making a warranty, a contract party warrants.
That might seem obvious, but you can’t say the same for another remedy
for inaccurate statements of fact, a claim for fraud. The term fraud refers just to
the end result of violation, so there’s no scope to derive from fraud a term for that
which was violated or, it follows, a verb for uttering that which was violated. If it
were otherwise, the doublet represents and warrants might instead have been part of
a triplet.
But the fact that both represents and warrants were theoretically available
doesn’t explain how they ended up in contracts. The simplest explanation is that
lawyers—ever prone to verbosity—tend to import into contracts terms of art
developed in jurisprudence. Once in contracts, such terms tend to supplant
simpler ones. Witness use in contracts of the terms of art allonge, attorn, and
novation. 58
As to how drafters came to use both represents and warrants in a doublet,
that can be explained by the urge to redundancy that has given rise to doublets
such as indemnify and hold harmless. 59 Because an inaccurate statement of fact can
give rise to an action for misrepresentation, an action for breach of warranty, or
both, lawyers prone to redundancy would naturally include both.
IV. A SOLUTION
The main problem with the verbs represents and warrants, used together or
apart, is that some think, despite lack of any plausible basis for doing so, that they
ROBERT A. FELDMAN & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, DRAFTING EFFECTIVE CONTRACTS: A
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE § 2.02 (2015).
56

See VLADIMIR R. ROSSMAN & MORTON MOSKIN, COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: STRATEGIES FOR
DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING § 2.03[E] (2015).
57

58

See ADAMS, supra note 3, ¶ 1.17, ¶ 13.7 (allonge), ¶¶ 13.56–62 (attorn), ¶¶ 13.478–80 (novation).

See id. ¶¶ 13.323–33; see generally BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE
294 (3d ed. 2011) (entry for “Doublets, Triplets, and Synonym-Strings”).

59
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imply particular remedies. One can expect that practitioners, commentators, and
judges who embrace or tolerate the remedies rationale despite its weaknesses will
continue spreading confusion. That could lead to time wasted in negotiations, as
well as time and money wasted in contract disputes that could have been avoided.
Furthermore, by using represents or warrants or both to introduce
statements of fact, one unnecessarily injects jurisprudence terms of art into
contracts. That makes contracts less clear, even for those who aren’t inclined to
see the verbs as having remedies implications.
There’s a simple two-part solution: use states to introduce facts and
address remedies directly.
A. Using States
The first part of the solution aims to eliminate confusion: Don’t use
represents, warrants, or the phrase represents and warrants to introduce statements of
fact.
It would be best to introduce statements of fact using the simplest verb
available, namely states. Other alternatives, such as asserts and confirms, carry
unnecessary rhetorical baggage. Use of states suggests use of the corresponding
noun phrase statement of fact instead of representation and warranty.
In addition to stating facts, one can also state opinions. But no reader
could reasonably conclude that what follows states—as in Acme states that the
Equipment is in good condition—is anything but a statement of fact. Similarly, no one
could reasonably doubt that a party making statements introduced by the verb
states is asserting that those statements are accurate. Nevertheless, when
introducing a series of statements of fact, it would be best to use as the
introductory phrase [Party name] states that the following facts are accurate, if only to
ensure that you have a full independent clause before the colon that follows. 60
One wouldn’t need to signal that an inaccurate statement of fact can give rise to a
remedy, just as one doesn’t need to signal that failure to comply with an
obligation gives rise to a remedy. 61
Using states to introduce statements of fact would be a complete break
with current practice. But the test of drafting usages isn’t profession-wide
consensus—they’re not subject to a popular vote. Anyone who drafts or reviews
contracts has the power, and the responsibility, to express the transaction as
clearly as possible, even if doing so requires embracing change.
60

See ADAMS, supra note 3, ¶ 4.32.

61

See 23 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 8, § 63:1.
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One can expect resistance to using states, at least initially. In some practice
areas, particularly mergers-and-acquisitions and financing, that resistance will
likely be stiff. It makes sense to preempt resistance by explaining in a cover note,
perhaps as part of a general explanation of contract usages, 62 why a given draft
uses states.
Lawyers on one or both sides of a transaction might be concerned that
states has unknown implications for remedies. You could allay those fears by
adding to a contract the following: The verb used to introduce a statement of fact in this
agreement does not affect the remedies available for inaccuracy of that statement of fact.
A drafter stuck with using represents or warrants or both could also use that
sentence. That situation might arise if using states would meet too much resistance
or provoke too much discussion. That’s more likely to be the case when you
propose revising the other side’s draft to use states as opposed to using states in
your own draft.
B. Addressing Remedies Directly
The second part of the solution to problems posed by represents and
warrants aims to establish clear meaning: If remedies are an issue, address remedies
explicitly. Putting one’s faith instead in the smoke-and-mirrors of any
combination of represents and warrants is nothing short of irresponsible.
That’s what led the London office of Jones Day to recommend as follows
in 2007:
[A] well-advised seller will always seek to exclude the remedies of
tortious claims and rescission by express provision to that effect
… , rather than by arguing that those rights are excluded by virtue
of simply characterizing the statement as a “warranty” and not a
“representation.” 63
Stark does not see addressing remedies explicitly as an alternative to using
represents and warrants:

See ADAMS, supra note 3, at xxxiii; Kenneth A. Adams, A Real-World Example of a Preempt-theTraditionalists Cover Note, ADAMS ON CONTRACT DRAFTING (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.adamsdrafting.com/a-real-world-example-of-a-preempt-the-traditionalists-covernote/; Kenneth A. Adams, Preempting Pushback from Traditionalists, ADAMS ON CONTRACT
DRAFTING (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.adamsdrafting.com/preempting-pushback-fromtraditionalists/.
62

63

Jones Day Newsletter, supra note 42.
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The existence of remedy provisions does not change the general
efficacy of or need for the phrase “represents and warrants.” …
[A]lthough some lawyers go to great lengths to structure
contractual remedy provisions to preclude tort remedies, that
approach is transaction specific. Many deals cannot afford the
transaction costs associated with detailed remedy provisions.
Instead, they provide for termination and rely on the parties
having the rights and remedies afforded by law and equity. 64
But this compares apples and oranges. Contract provisions aimed at
precluding extra-contractual tort liability can indeed be elaborate, 65 but they go
beyond whatever a drafter might be trying to accomplish with represents or warrants
or both.
Expressing the equivalent of represents or warrants or both is more
straightforward. Instead of using represents and warrants to introduce statements of
fact, a drafter who embraces the remedies rationale could achieve the same effect
by stating that each party may bring a claim for misrepresentation, a claim for
breach of warranty, or both if the other party makes inaccurate statements of fact.
And instead of using just warrants, a drafter who embraces the restrictive remedies
rationale could achieve the same effect by stating that each party waives any right
to bring a claim for misrepresentation if the other party makes inaccurate
statements of fact; one could also make it explicit that each party may instead
bring a claim for breach of warranty. (The mirror-image of that provision would
express the restrictive-remedies-rationale equivalent of using just represents.)
Electing one remedy over the other might offer advantages. For example,
a claimant might prefer being able to bring a misrepresentation claim over a
breach-of warranty claim if doing so offers a longer statute of limitations or seems
likely to permit a claim for a greater amount damages, 66 even if the claimant
would have to meet a greater burden to prevail. 67
But for five reasons, the utility of such provisions is uncertain.

64

Stark, supra note 11.

See West & Lewis, supra note 8, at 1036–38 (offering model contract provisions intended to
exclude extra-contractual tort liability).

65

Cf. Rafal Zakrzewski, Representations and Warranties Distinguished, BUTTERWORTHS J. OF INT’L
BANKING AND FIN. L. 341, 342–43 (2013) (offering an illustration of the difference under English
law between damages for breach of warranty and damages for misrepresentation).
66

67

See supra text accompanying note 8.
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First, the likelihood of being able to enforce such provisions is mixed.
Saying that a party may bring a particular kind of claim doesn’t guarantee that a
court would find that a party had met the requirements for that kind of claim. But
courts in both the United States 68 and England 69 generally accept that parties may
exclude remedies by contract, subject to a fairness or reasonableness standard.
Second, such provisions are limited in scope. A simple statement that a
party waives any right to bring a claim for misrepresentation presumably leaves
plenty of room for claimant mischief of the sort drafters seek to avoid by using
provisions excluding extra-contractual liability.
Third, rote limiting of remedies might not make sense. For example, the
English aversion to rescission as a remedy, regardless of the context, has the merit
of simplicity but doesn’t take into account that rescission might sometimes be an
appropriate remedy for either party, depending on the circumstances. It’s
reminiscent of another knee-jerk remedies strategy, eliminating consequential
damages. 70
Fourth, for many contract parties, considering the potential sources of
dispute and the remedies implications of any such dispute could be distracting,
time-consuming, and ultimately speculative.
And fifth, if a party wishes to control remedies, it might well elect to do
so more simply and assertively by providing for indemnification 71 or liquidated
damages or by imposing limits on liability, bearing in mind that doing so
effectively poses a different set of challenges.
But all those issues are beyond the scope of this article. What’s relevant
for present purposes is that instead of using represents, warrants, or both with the
aim of including or excluding particular remedies, it would be clearer to express
the intended meaning explicitly, although it’s a separate question whether doing
so would be worthwhile.

See HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 17:12 (courts are more likely to
respond favorably to contractual modifications of remedies if they are fair).
68

See Misrepresentation Act, (1967) § 3 (Eng.) (stating that a term that excludes or restricts any
liability or remedy for misrepresentation “shall be of no effect except in so far as it satisfies the
requirement of reasonableness”; Zakrzewski, supra note 66, at 343 (noting that in England the
judicial policy has been to uphold exclusions of liability for misrepresentation in commercial
contracts).
69

70

See ADAMS, supra note 3, ¶¶ 13.105–24.

71

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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V. USE OF WARRANTS IN THE CONTEXT OF SALE OF GOODS
This article has thus far considered use of represents or warrants, or both, to
introduce statements of fact other than statements of fact regarding goods in a
contract for sale of those goods. In the context of sale of goods, use of warranty
relates to the law on warranties in sale of goods 72 and, to some extent, services, 73
so in that context warranty serves a different function than it does when represents
or warrants, or both, are used elsewhere. That’s why it’s routine for a contract for
the sale of goods to use the verb warrants or the noun warranty to make assertions
regarding the goods and also to use represents and warrants to introduce other
statements of fact.
A. Used to Introduce Obligations
In contracts for the sale of goods, warranty can be used, as a matter of the
law of warranties, to refer not only to a statement of fact but also to an
obligation. 74 Use of warrants in contracts to introduce an obligation would seem
consistent with that: Acme warrants that it shall maintain the Equipment as stated on
schedule A.
But adding warrants in front of an obligation adds nothing to the
obligation. Arguably it makes it clear that that obligation is a warranty, but that’s
not evident, as it’s routine for drafters to use language of declaration unnecessarily
to introduce a provision that already has an appropriate verb. 75 An example:
Supplier acknowledges that it shall verify the Supplier employee’s identity and eligibility before
assigning them to perform Services. This use of warrants could simply be another
example of that tendency.
Furthermore, it would seem odd to flag certain obligations in this manner,
given that you don’t have to use the verb warrants for a contract provision to be
treated as a warranty. 76 Why single certain obligations out for special treatment?

See 18 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 8, § 52:45 (placing discussion of warranties in the
chapter on contracts for the sale of personal property).
72

See id. (stating that there is a division of opinion whether the express warranty concepts in the
Uniform Commercial Code are also applicable or may be extended to service agreements).
73

74

See U.C.C. § 2-313.

See Kenneth A. Adams, Extraneous Language of Declaration, ADAMS ON CONTRACT DRAFTING
(Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.adamsdrafting.com/extraneous-language-of-declaration/.

75

76

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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B. Used to Introduce Statements of “Future Facts”
It’s commonplace for warrants to be used to introduce what commentators
call “future facts,” 77 as in The Seller warrants that the Units will comply with the
Specifications.
But such provisions don’t state facts—the circumstances in question
haven’t occurred yet. Instead, a statement of “future facts” usually serves to state
an obligation indirectly. It would be clearer to state the obligation directly. That
involves some subtlety:
•

The Seller shall sell to the Buyer Units that comply with the Specification could be
interpreted as meaning that the Seller would comply with this obligation
by selling to the Buyer some units that comply with the specifications and
others that don’t comply.

•

The Seller shall sell to the Buyer only Units that comply with the Specifications could
be interpreted as meaning that the Seller may sell no other products to the
Buyer.

•

The shortcomings in the previous two examples would be avoided by
saying The Seller shall sell to the Buyer 5,000 Units that comply with the
Specifications.

•

But it might be simpler to say All Units that the Seller sells to the Buyer must
comply with the Specifications.

•

Compliance with specifications could be addressed exclusively in an
explicit remedy, by saying If a Unit fails to comply with the Specifications, then
… . But addressing compliance in both an obligation and an explicit
remedy might give the Buyer more options for remedies.

As a matter of idiom, it’s standard for people to speak in terms of “future
facts”: I promise that the cake will be ready! I guarantee that you’ll be happy. But that
doesn’t mean that couching contract provisions as “future facts” makes sense.
C. Followed by a Noun
Although warrants is usually followed by a that-clause, it can also be
followed by a noun: The Seller warrants the Units against defects in materials or
workmanship. This too is equivalent to an obligation to sell conforming goods; it
would be simpler to state it as such.

77

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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D. Used to Introduce Statement of Facts
The verb warrants can be used to introduce facts relating to current
circumstances (The Seller warrants that the Equipment is in good working order) or facts
referring to the past (The Seller warrants that the Units were manufactured in February
2015).
Such statements are warranties as a matter of law. As such, introducing
them with warrants would seem less objectionable than using represents and warrants
to introduce every statement of fact in a contract. Nevertheless, it would be
preferable not to use warrants in this context. Just as it would be odd to flag
certain obligations as being warranties, 78 it would be odd to flag certain statement
of facts as being warranties—you don’t have to use the verb warrants for a
statement of fact to be treated as a warranty. 79 And drafters and readers would
likely be uncertain as to the implications of introducing only some statements of
fact with warrants.
Instead, use in this context the solution advocated above for other
statements of fact—in other words, use states to introduce all statements of fact,
including those that might be warranties as a matter of law.
E. Using Warranty As a Heading
Whereas use of represents and warrants to introduce statements of fact
appears to be an empty ritual, the notion of warranties in the context of sales of
goods is widely understood, even by the public. So it would be unobjectionable to
signal that a contract contains warranties.
Drafters have available a more straightforward way of accomplishing that
than tinkering with verbs, namely by using Warranties as a section heading. The
section itself wouldn’t have to use the verb warrants. But anyone using this
approach should bear in mind that a contract might include outside of the section
entitled Warranties provisions that a court might conclude are warranties as a
matter of law.
VI. BROADER RELEVANCE
Purging represents and warrants from contracts would make contracts
clearer, would save time in negotiation, and would spare contract parties and their
lawyers from being caught up in term-of-art confusion.
But there are broader implications.
78

See supra text accompanying note 76.

79

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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The defining characteristic of contract drafting is that each new
transaction will closely resemble other transactions. As a result, the urge is to copy
contracts used in other transactions, making only whatever adjustments are
necessary to reflect the new transaction.
That could be a source of strength, but because traditional contract
language is a dysfunctional stew of archaisms, redundancy, chaotic use of verbs,
overlong sentences, confusing terminology, and other problems, 80 wholesale
copying has given rise to a pathology this author calls “passive drafting”: 81
•

You don’t have the time or, in all likelihood, the expertise to reassess the
language of precedent contracts and templates, so you copy it, on faith,
assuming that because it was thought suitable for other comparable
transactions it will work for yours.

•

Because it has been “tested”—in other words, has been scrutinized by the
courts—you stick with contract language that has given rise to disputes.

•

Because you’re copying, you don’t need guidelines.

•

Because you’re copying, no one needs to be trained.

•

And as part of convincing yourself that copying is a matter of best
practices rather than simple expediency, you accept as meaningful
distinctions between contract usages what are in fact obscurantist
rationalizations.

The result is that traditional contract language remains dysfunctional, and
so does the process.
Attempts to distinguish between represents and warrants as contract usages
fall within the final element in the passive-drafting pathology outlined above. So
do attempts to distinguish between indemnify and hold harmless, 82 and best efforts and
reasonable efforts (in England, best endeavours and reasonable endeavours). 83 The most
important point about all such reasoning is not just that it fails to convince but
that the usages advocated come a distant second-best to saying clearly whatever it
is you want to say.
See Kenneth A. Adams, Dysfunction in Contract Drafting: The Causes and a Cure, 15 TENN. J. BUS. L.
317 (2014).
80

See Kenneth A. Adams, Active Drafting: A Short Manifesto, ADAMS ON CONTRACT DRAFTING
(Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.adamsdrafting.com/active-drafting-a-short-manifesto/.

81

82

See ADAMS, supra note 3, ¶¶ 13.323–33.

83

See id. ¶¶ 8.4–40.
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The alternative to passive drafting is “active drafting”:
•

You follow a comprehensive set of guidelines for contract language.

•

You get trained in how to draft and review contracts consistent with those
guidelines.

•

You aim to use templates and precedent contracts that are consistent with
those guidelines.

•

Unless the law gives you no choice, you don’t continue using confusing
language, applying whatever gloss courts have given it. Instead, you
employ only those usages that avoid undue risk of confusion.

•

You don’t attempt to address deal points by invoking inscrutable
distinctions in legalistic terminology. Instead, you address issues explicitly
and clearly.

Because analysis of represents and warrants ties into broader discussion of
what we want contract language to look like, it serves as something of a litmus
test. That leads to the following observations:
First, two prominent commentators, Tina Stark and Bryan Garner, have
in effect endorsed the remedies rationale for significance of the verbs represents
and warrants. It would be surprising if that wasn’t at least somewhat representative
of their general approach, and in the case of both Stark 84 and Garner, 85 it seems
to be.
Second, it’s disconcerting that English practitioners and judges have fallen
so heavily for the restrictive remedies rationale for use of the verbs represents and
warrants. Add to that their unhelpful treatment of endeavours provisions 86 and one
has reason to wonder whether the problem is systemic.
Third, in this author’s experience, the Section of Business Law of the
American Bar Association tends to favor traditional contract language. Use of
represents and warrants in the ABA Model Stock Purchase Agreement and its

See Kenneth A. Adams, It’s Time to Get Rid of the “Successors and Assigns” Provision, ADVOCATE,
June/July 2013, at 30 (critiquing Stark’s analysis of the “successors and assigns” provision).

84

See Kenneth A. Adams, Some “Efforts” Advice That I Wouldn’t Give, ADAMS ON CONTRACT
DRAFTING (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.adamsdrafting.com/some-efforts-advice-that-i-wouldntgive/ (critiquing Garner’s recommendation regarding use of best efforts and reasonable efforts).
85

86 See Kenneth A. Adams, Beyond Words, SOLICITORS J., Sept. 30, 2014, at 18 (best endeavours and its
variants under English law).
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endorsement of an unconvincing explanation for use of represents and warrants87 is
consistent with that. It can be challenging to change the approach of volunteer
group efforts such as those behind the Section of Business Law’s model
contracts, but if the Section of Business Law wishes to advance the cause of
active drafting, it’s well positioned to do so.
And finally, lawyers and others who work with contracts should bear in
mind that they don’t have to follow the herd when it comes to contract usages. 88
The only people you have to convince are those on your side of the transaction
and on the other side of the transaction. Given the ubiquity of the phrase represents
and warrants, the incoherence of traditional approaches to use of those verbs, and
the merits of instead simply using states and addressing remedies explicitly (if
that’s thought to be worthwhile), initiating conversations about represents and
warrants might be a good way to promote active drafting and help bring contract
prose into the modern age.

87

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

88

See supra text accompanying notes 61–62.

